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The Affordability of Flood Risk Property-Level Adaptation
Measures
Paul Hudson ∗
The affordability of property-level adaptation measures against flooding is crucial due to the
movement toward integrated flood risk management, which requires the individuals threat-
ened by flooding to actively manage flooding. It is surprising to find that affordability is not
often discussed, given the important roles that affordability and social justice play regarding
flood risk management. This article provides a starting point for investigating the potential
rate of unaffordability of flood risk property-level adaptation measures across Europe using
two definitions of affordability, which are combined with two different affordability thresh-
olds from within flood risk research. It uses concepts of investment and payment affordability,
with affordability thresholds based on residual income and expenditure definitions of unaf-
fordability. These concepts, in turn, are linked with social justice through fairness concerns,
in that, all should have equal capability to act, of which affordability is one avenue. In doing
so, it was found that, for a large proportion of Europe, property owners generally cannot
afford to make one-time payment of the cost of protective measures. These can be made af-
fordable with installment payment mechanisms or similar mechanisms that spread costs over
time. Therefore, the movement toward greater obligations for flood-prone residents to ac-
tively adapt to flooding should be accompanied by socially accessible financing mechanisms.
KEY WORDS: Affordability; flood risk; social justice; risk reduction
1. INTRODUCTION
Flooding is a significant threat to humanity
(UNISDR, 2011), which leads to investments in pro-
tective measures. Structural measures, such as dikes,
are a common investment as these measures aim to
prevent flooding. However, structural measures are
expensive, and as such investment decisions balance
protective capability with cost. Thus, it is unlikely
that structural measures will protect against all pos-
sible floods as costs grow compared to the expected
benefit (Merz, Kreibich, & Apel, 2008).
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This outcome has resulted in a movement toward
integrated flood risk management, which requires
all individuals threatened by flooding to limit flood
risk in accordance with their capabilities (Bubeck,
Aerts, de Moel, & Kreibich, 2016) as a complement
to more traditional approaches. For example, flood-
prone property owners in Germany are required to
undertake measures that limit flood damage wher-
ever possible (Thieken et al., 2016b). Therefore,
there has been much research into the employment
and cost-effectiveness of property-level adaptation
(de Ruig, Haer, de Moel, Botzen, & Aerts, 2019; DE-
FRA, 2008; Hudson, Botzen, Kreibich, Bubeck, &
Aerts, 2014; Kreibich, Christenberger, & Schwarze,
2011; Lamond, Rose, Bhattacharya-Mis, & Joseph,
2018; Poussin, Botzen, & Aerts, 2015) within
this environment of changing responsibilities (see
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Bogliacino, Codagnone, & Veltri (2016), for a discus-
sion across policy areas).
Property-level adaptation measures are broadly
split into dry flood-proofing, which prevents floodwa-
ter from entering a building, and wet flood-proofing,
which limits flood damage once water has entered a
building. Kreibich, Bubeck, Van Vliet, and De Moel
(2015) reviewed the literature on the effectiveness
of property-level measures, indicating that property-
level measures can be cost beneficial and can play a
useful, and complementary, role in flood risk man-
agement. This finding has led to these measures being
linked with insurance (Michel-Kerjan, 2010; Michel-
Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011; Surminski, 2014). This
is because insurance is often assumed to incentivize
additional risk reduction by policyholders. However,
an active link between insurance and property-level
adaptation is not strongly present across Europe
(Surminski et al., 2015) or many other jurisdictions
across the world (Kunreuther, 1996; Thistlethwaite,
Henstra, Brown, & Scott, 2018). Despite this, the af-
fordability of insurance premiums is a concern as,
while risk-reflective premiums potentially provide
the strongest incentives, they can also become un-
affordable. For instance, Kousky and Kunreuther
(2014) find an unaffordability rate of 35% for Ocean
County, New Jersey. FEMA (2018) find that low-
and medium-income households are forgoing insur-
ance as it is seen to be unaffordable. Hudson, Botzen,
Feyen, and Aerts (2016) find that about 20% of
households at risk of flooding in France and Ger-
many find risk-based premiums unaffordable, when
judged in relation to the level of a household’s in-
come relative to a poverty line.
The ability to afford property-level adaptation
measures is linked to broader socioeconomic in-
equalities (Kaufmann, Priest, & Leroy, 2018) and
the fairness of flood risk management approaches
(Thaler, Fuchs, Priest, & Doorn, 2018) through its
social justice implications. This is because once an
adaptation strategy is unaffordable, those exposed to
flooding face additional unfair burdens in managing
flood impacts. The redistribution of responsibilities
under integrated flood risk management could lead
to new patterns of inequality and injustice. There-
fore, potentially unequal distribution of burden is
an important concern in an environment of increase
mandates to act.
While there is not a single concept of jus-
tice, the concept of justice employed in the current
study draws upon the fairness principles of John-
son, Penning-Rowsell, and Parker (2007). Therefore,
based on this concept of justice, all of those threat-
ened should have an equal opportunity and capac-
ity to adapt, which is important when new obliga-
tions are introduced. Those who are significantly
financially burdened may require additional assis-
tance (Johnson et al., 2007; Montgomery & Kun-
reuther, 2018; Sayers, Penning-Rowsell, & Horritt,
2018).
This article provides a starting point for em-
pirically operationalizing an aspect of social justice
in flood risk adaptation based and developed upon
the fairness principles of Johnson et al. (2007). This
is done by investigating what can be considered a
fair or affordable contribution toward property-level
flood risk adaptation measures across the European
Union (EU). The potential rate of unaffordability of
property-level flood risk adaptation measures is mea-
sured using two definitions of affordability, which
are combined with two different affordability thresh-
olds from within flood risk research. The EU scale of
this article is relevant in terms of Floods Directive,
and similar, which requires that while countries can
approach flood risk management in their own way,
there is an implict degree, or intention, of degree of
comparability between published risk management
plans or outcomes for countries to compare and learn
from each other. Therefore, this study acts within this
environment by employing a common methodology
and public data source to provide an initial indication
of the state of affordability.
The concept of affordability helps in understand-
ing the justice implications of integrated flood risk
management decision making (Thaler et al., 2018) by
acting as a metric concerning fair flood risk manage-
ment. This is in addition to wider indicators of so-
cial vulnerability, see, for example, Cutter, Boruff,
and Shirley (2003), which include factors such as em-
ployment status, education level, age, local infras-
tructure quality, that can operate at both the regional
and individual levels as the concept of affordabil-
ity does but are less focused as a fairness metric.
While it is uncertain whether or not flood-prone ar-
eas contain a substantial number of socially vulner-
able individuals (Collins, Grineski, & Chakraborty,
2018; Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014; Hale, Flint,
Jackson-Smith, & Endter-Wada, 2018; Koks, Jong-
man, Husby, & Botzen, 2015), the socially vulnerable
are more heavily subjectively impacted by flooding
(Bubeck & Thieken, 2018; Cutter, 2017; Hale et al.,
2018; Hudson, Pham, & Bubeck, 2019). They also
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can have more limited abilities to absorb or to re-
cover from flood events, leading to larger subjective
impacts (Kaufmann et al., 2018; Walker & Burning-
ham, 2011). This disproportionate effect is the result
of unequal levels of community and individual re-
silience (Kaufmann et al., 2018), which is measured
across their ability to resist (to lower impacts), re-
cover (to bounce back), or possess adaptive capacity
(the ability to learn and improve; Thieken, Mariani,
Longfield, & Vanneuville, 2014). Addressing afford-
ability offers an avenue for addressing this resilience
gap by taking into account the ability of individuals to
contribute a “fair” amount of resources toward flood
risk management (an aspect of adaptive capacity).
The results suggest the need for mechanisms for
helping the lower income residents of flood-prone ar-
eas to adapt to flooding. Low-cost loans are an of-
ten suggested way of doing so (e.g., Botzen & van
den Bergh, 2008, or Montgomery & Kunreuther,
2018). When such mechanisms are employed, the
large difference between rates of unaffordability im-
plies the importance of considering how households
finance this investment. Many current studies con-
sidering property-level adaptation, in effect, assume
that households have access to suitable financing
mechanisms and can employ them if the measure
is found to be cost-beneficial. This assumption may
not hold and therefore could be one factor inhibit-
ing the development of property-level risk manage-
ment. While these affordability-enhancing measures
have been suggested in the wider literature, this is the
first article that directly measures and highlights their
importance. This is relevant with the increasing focus
on action by residents in flood-prone areas, whereby
an increasing focus should be placed on social justice
considerations.
2. DATA AND METHODS
The methodology and data are discussed below,
and summarized in Fig. 1.
2.1. Property-Level Flood Adaptation Measures
2.1.1. Effectiveness
Considering the effectiveness of property-level
adaptation is a first step in studying affordability.
Measures that are not cost-beneficial are not a use-
ful expenditure and as such are a negative burden if
employed.
In the wider scientific literature, Kreibich et al.
(2015) find a mean effectiveness estimate for dry
flood-proofing of 45% of damage prevented (range
= 10%–85%) and 35% (range = 10%–53%) for
wet flood-proofing. However, these estimates may
represent the upper boundary of effectiveness due
to the influence of local conditions (Hudson et al.,
2014; Kreibich et al., 2015; Poussin et al., 2015);
the complexities of studying fragmentary, hetero-
geneous, and incomplete impact data (Schröter,
Molinari, Kunz, & Kreibich, 2018; Thieken et al.,
2016a); and different modeling/empirical identifi-
cation strategies (Kreibich et al., 2015). However,
property-level adaptation measures are overall cost-
beneficial when there is a 2%–5% flooding proba-
bility (DEFRA, 2008; Hudson et al., 2014; Kreibich
et al., 2011; Lamond et al., 2018; Poussin et al.,
2015), and smaller/cheaper investments such as oil
tank protection are invested in (Kreibich et al.,
2015).
However, dry flood-proofing is more appro-
priate in minor flood potential areas as such
measures can be overtopped (Kreibich, Thieken,
Petrow, Müller, & Merz, 2005) or face physi-
cal limitations due to hydrostatic pressures af-
ter 1 m (Aerts, 2018). Wet flood-proofing does
not face this issue and may be better suited to
areas with greater flood potential. Additionally,
May and Chatterton (2012) have highlighted that
property-level adaptation measures could be associ-
ated with a reliability of 77%–90%, with measures
that do not need to be redeployed displaying higher
reliability.
Overall, despite these limitations, property-level
adaptation can play a role in managing flooding, as
a complement to structural measures based on the
findings within wider literature.
2.1.2. Costs
Detailed information on costs per building is lim-
ited (Kreibich et al., 2015) and uncertain (Aerts,
2018) as the cost of building-level adaptation is highly
variable. Individual building costs depend on a range
of factors such as the type, age, and size of a property
and the expected type, depth, and duration of flood-
ing. A common simplification is to average across
building classes (Lamond et al., 2018), including, in
effect, the current study.
A systematic literature review of dry and wet
flood-proofing costs is presented in Aerts (2018), who
focuses on two cost types: construction costs and
1154 Hudson
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the study’s methodological process.
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operation and maintenance costs. Aerts defines con-
struction costs as fixed, one-time expenses such as
planning, purchasing materials and machinery, land
acquisition, construction labor, permits. While op-
eration and maintenance costs include yearly costs
needed to operate, maintain, monitor, and replace
equipment, Aerts finds that in many cases specific
cost estimates were either not provided or cost infor-
mation was incomplete. Aerts notes that these costs
are distributed over developed and developing coun-
tries.
In order to use suitable costs from Aerts (2018),
due to the current study’s focus on Europe, the es-
timates from the United Kingdom and Germany are
most relevant (followed by the United States). This
provides a baseline estimate from Western Europe.
Aerts finds that, in terms of construction costs, in
the United Kingdom, dry flood-proofing residential
buildings, for 1 m of dry proofing, costs $13,000–
$18,200 (2008 dollars). Aerts finds an estimate of
$732 (2011 dollars) per meter of dry flood-proofing
in Germany. For wet flood-proofing, the U.K. esti-
mate is $8,073–$18,369 (2008 dollars) for a residential
building and a total cost of $22,237 (2011 dollars) for
a 65 m2 residential building in Germany. Concern-
ing maintenance costs, maintenance costs per year
are estimated at 1%–3% of the construction costs for
dry flood-proofing, and at less than 1% of investment
costs. Therefore, maintenance costs are included for
dry flood-proofing but not wet flood-proofing. These
values, in 2015 euros, are presented as Scheme 1 in
Table I.
These estimates provide a cost baseline to be fur-
ther altered according to dwelling size. As an illustra-
tion, the average dwelling size for those in the bottom
20% of income across the EU is 81 m2, while for the
top 20% the average dwelling size is 114 m2 (Euro-
stat variable ID: ilc_hcmh01). In order to differenti-
ate costs by dwelling size, three approaches are used.
The first is a rescaling of Scheme 1 by the ratio of
the mean dwelling size within an income quintile rel-
ative to the European average (Eurostat variable ID:
ilc_hcmh01). Therefore, a dwelling that is 20% larger
than the European average dwelling has 20% larger
costs. See Scheme 2 in Table I.
The second approach uses the dwelling sizes
in Germany and the United Kingdom and costs in
Scheme 1 to produce costs per linear meter of dry
flood-proofing and per square meter for wet flood-
proofing. This approach was used in Aerts, Botzen,
and de Moel (2013) for New York City. This results
in a cost range of €423 to €695 per linear meter of dry
flood-proofing (based on the building’s perimeter)
in 2015 euros once maintenance costs are included.
The corresponding value for wet flood-proofing is
€104–€332 per m2. When costs per building are es-
timated, the costs for dry flood-proofing are €16,000–
€27,000 and €9,400–€30,000 for wet flood-proofing.
See Scheme 3 in Table I.
The final cost scheme, Scheme 4, also uses the
above approach but is combined with the U.S. cost
data presented in Aerts et al. (2013). While the costs
for retrofitting buildings in the United States and Eu-
rope may differ, the approach has been successfully
employed, such as in Austria (Unterberger, Hudson,
Botzen, Schroeer, & Steininger, 2019). The costs fol-
lowing Scheme 4, in 2015 euros, result in an average
cost of €10,800 for dry flood-proofing and €2,700 for
wet flood-proofing.
Moreover, as was noted, cost-effective property-
level adaptation measures tend to be smaller/cheaper
measures (Kreibich et al., 2015), which are associated
with the lower cost estimate. Therefore, the lower
cost estimate is focused upon to represent the most
optimistic case. Bureaucratic cost categories, for ex-
ample, permits or building surveys, are excluded
from this analysis as a simplification. A further caveat
is that these estimates may be rather generic and use
older (potentially outdated) sources.
2.2. Affordability
2.2.1. Affordability Definitions
There is no single definition of affordability due
to its normative nature (National Research Council,
2015; Saenz, 2009). However, it is considered that a
purchase is affordable if it does not result in the pur-
chaser facing a financial burden at the time of pur-
chase (National Research Council, 2015). In essence,
this can be seen as a fair contribution of resources
toward adaptation, which naturally overlaps with the
social justice fairness and their adaptive capacity to
act. The focus of affordability is on budgets rather
than potential benefits. A measure can bring long-
run benefits and be an immediate burden, limiting
adaptive capacity.
A complication regarding the affordability of
property-level adaptation measures, as compared
to flood insurance, is that property-level adapta-
tion measures are stock variables. Therefore, addi-
tional formulation is required. The first is “invest-
ment affordability,” which is the ability to buy or to
access sufficient resources that allow for a purchase.
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The second is “payment affordability,” which is con-
cerned with the series of annualized expenditures on
the measure. Investment affordability is applicable
when there is less ability to intertemporally spread
the resources needed to by an adaptation measure.
Payment affordability is the reverse.
The comparison of outcomes under both afford-
ability definitions indicates the importance of hav-
ing such cost-spreading mechanism. The literature
regarding property-level adaptation does not actively
consider the resources available to the potential em-
ployer or tend to focus on other elements of the
decision-making process. The larger the magnitude
of the difference between the two concepts of afford-
ability, there is a greater need to consider the fair-
ness aspects of adaptation, of which affordability is
one element. One expectation is Montgomery and
Kunreuther (2018) who conduct a cost–benefit anal-
ysis of elevating households in a region of the United
States, both for a single up-front payment and when
loans are provided. While Montgomery and Kun-
reuther did not focus on investigating affordability,
their study highlights the relevance of affordability.
2.2.2. Affordability Thresholds
In this analysis, two threshold categories are as-
sumed across investment and payment affordabil-
ity. The first threshold assumes that a property-level
adaptation measure is affordable if the expenditure
lies below a certain percentage of disposable income.
For example, Kousky and Kunreuther (2014) use
a 5% of income threshold for calculating flood in-
surance affordability. The expenditure definition is
shown in Equation (1), where a property-level adap-
tation measure is affordable under the expenditure
threshold (AETi, j,c) for individual i if the expenditure on
a given property-level adaptation measure (EMi, j ) is
below a certain percentage (α) of disposable income
(Idi, j,c). An expenditure threshold of 5% of disposable
income is selected, matching Kousky and Kunreuther
(2014), with complementary values of 10% and 20%.
A value of AETi equal to 1 indicates that the measure
is affordable and 0 if not.
AETi =
{
1 if EMi ≤ αI
d
i




The second definition is focused on poverty-line
indicators, as in Hudson et al. (2016). This approach
indicates that a property-level adaptation measure is
affordable if the buyer is left with a minimum dispos-
able, or residual, income after the purchase (Equa-
tion (2)). For residual income threshold (ARITi ), a
measure is affordable if a purchase does not lower
the purchaser’s remaining disposable income to be-
low the relative poverty line in a given country (PLc),
which is 60% of the national median disposable in-
come (a preexisting definition across Europe).
ARITi =
{
1 if EMi ≤ I
d
i − PLc




However, in practice, threshold values should be
selected by local stakeholders (National Research
Council, 2015) but using a single definition across re-
gions generates a basis for comparison.
2.2.3. Payment Structures
Investment affordability directly compares the
price of a given measure with income, as the pur-
chase is a single upfront payment. Payment afford-
ability applies when a series of annualized payment is
made for a given measure. One suggested mechanism
to annualize payments is low-cost loans, as in Botzen
and van den Bergh (2008) or Montgomery and
Kunreuther (2018). Additionally, in assuming the
presence of low-cost loans investment affordability
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is no longer relevant, as the loan provides sufficient
resources instead. Therefore, the ability to annualize
costs changes the relevant concept of affordability in
a similar way to mortgages and property purchases.
The annual repayments (M) are, following
Equation (3), related to a fixed interest rate r and
the number of years (n) for the loan’s repayment pe-
riod. However, as the loans purpose is to spread the
financial cost of a measure, it is possible that other






(1 + r)n − 1
. (3)
Across the Eurozone, mortgages tend to be is-
sued with a maturity ranging between 20 and 30 years
(ECB, 2009), which matches the expected life span
of dry and wet flood-proofing (Aerts, 2018). The rate
of inflation is selected as the interest rate to main-
tain the loan’s real value. This is due to the mecha-
nism aiming to maximize social access to adaptation
measures. It is possible that in practice higher interest
rates will be charged in order to cover the possibility
of defaults.
2.2.4. Household Income
In order to investigate affordability, data on
income distribution are required, which are not
available from a single source. Therefore, house-
hold income data are based on an approximation
of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statis-
tics (NUTS) two-level household-level disposable
income, which was the lowest spatial data level avail-
able for a study operating at a high level across Eu-
rope.
The first step was to collect data from the
European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC) database for 2015 (variable
ID: ilc_di01) on disposable income, as the latest year
with the most complete information. Data were ex-
tracted for the top cutoff points for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
4th, 5th, 10th, 20th, 25th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th,
75th, 80th, 90th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, and 99th per-
centiles. Missing values were interpolated as a linear
increase between known values.
However, EU-SILC data are at the national level
and, as such, are complemented by regional data for
mean disposable household income (Eurostat vari-
able ID: nama_10r_2hhinc). In order to generate re-
gional income distributions, the national income dis-
tribution was downscaled. This was done by dividing
each income percentile for a specific country by that
country’s mean income. This provided a scaling ra-
tio for each income percentile relative to the mean
income, and the mean disposable income per region
was then rescaled. This produces country-specific in-
come distribution shapes (e.g., France and Germany
have different distributions), which centered on dif-
ferent values for a given region (i.e., each NUTS 2 re-
gion within a country is positioned differently). This
assumption abstracts away how income distributions
differ in flood-prone areas, the patterns of which may
also differ across different flood types (Walker &
Burningham, 2011), or between more rural and ur-
ban areas.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Rates of Investment Unaffordability
3.1.1. Residual Income Threshold
The levels of investment unaffordability across
regions are presented in Fig. 2 based on the residual
income definition for the average quintile for which
dry or wet flood-proofing is found to be unafford-
able across the cost schemes. For dry flood-proofing
(Panel A), the highest model quintile at which dry
flood-proofing becomes unaffordable is the third in-
come quintile for Cost Schemes 1, 2, and 4, which in-
creases to the fourth quintile under Cost Scheme 3.
The spatial pattern for the average highest quintile
of unaffordability is also indicated in Fig. 2, averaged
across cost schemes. The highest rates of unafford-
ability are found in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States,
southern Iberia, and southern Belgium, as the rates
of unaffordability in these locations lie between the
3.75th and 5th income quintiles. Austria, Southern
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Ireland have the
lowest rates of unaffordability for dry flood-proofing,
lying between the 1.75th and 3rd income quintiles.
Turning to wet flood-proofing (Panel B), under
the residual income distribution, the highest model
quintile at which dry flood-proofing becomes unaf-
fordable is the first quintile for Cost Schemes 1, 2,
and 4, which increases to the third quintile under
Cost Scheme 3. Overall, the rates of unaffordability
are lower for wet flood-proofing (as seen in Fig. 2).
Northern Europe, Western Europe, and Northern
Italy display rates of unaffordability for wet flood-
proofing below the second income quintile. Southern
Europe and the Baltic States tend to be located be-
tween the 2nd and 2.75th income quintiles. Eastern
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Fig. 2. The highest quintile for which flood-proofing is found investment unaffordable, on average across cost schemes, under the residual
income definition.
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Table II. The Rates of Investment Unaffordability under the Expenditure Definition of Unaffordability
Cost Scheme 1 Cost Scheme 2 Cost Scheme 3 Cost Scheme 4 Average
5% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 99 99 99 99 99
Wet flood-proofing 97 98 99 99 98
10% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 99 99 99 99 99
Wet flood-proofing 80 84 99 90 88
20% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 96 98 99 99 98
Wet flood-proofing 48 43 99 62 63
Europe, on the whole, displays the highest rates of
unaffordability of at least the 2nd income quintile.
3.1.2. Expenditure Threshold
The results presented in Table II show very high
rates of unaffordability across the studied investment
affordability thresholds. The nearly 100% rates un-
der all cost schemes for dry flood-proofing highlight
the financial burden if measures must be paid up-
front. The significance of the burden can be seen
from the threshold of 20% of disposable income re-
quired to bring the rate of unaffordability for wet
flood-proofing below 50% for Cost Schemes 1 and
2, while still suffering from a significant burden for
dry flood-proofing across all cost schemes presented
in Table II.
Moreover, the rates of unaffordability under the
expenditure definition are much higher than under
the residual income differentiation. This difference
occurs because the two definitions of affordability fo-
cus on different aspects of affordability. The residual
income definition focuses on the lowest income mem-
bers of society, as those below the poverty line will
always be deemed to face unaffordable expenditures.
The expenditure definition has a wider ranging scope
due to its focus on a certain percentage of income,
which allows everyone to contribute toward the costs
of property-level adaptation measures.
3.2. Rates of Payment Unaffordability
Assuming the full uptake of loans, the rates of
investment unaffordability are high under both defi-
nitions given that the measures must be paid for up-
front. The introduction of low-cost loans reduces the
highest quintile of unaffordability to the first quin-
tile almost universally under the residual income def-
inition for dry and wet flood-proofing. This is be-
cause the residual income definition produces a lower
bound of unaffordability at the poverty rate, which
was 16% on average across Europe in 2015. In per-
centiles, this implies a rate of unaffordability on av-
erage equal to 20% for dry flood-proofing and 17%
for wet flood-proofing. This represents a reduction in
unaffordability of nearly 71% for dry flood-proofing
and 44% for wet flood-proofing under the residual
income definition of unaffordability. The locations
of these results are presented in Panel A (dry flood-
proofing) and Panel B (wet flood-proofing) of Fig. 3.
The introduction of loans has a stronger impact
on the rate of payment unaffordability under the ex-
penditure threshold. The change in the rate of unaf-
fordability due to the loans is, on average, 50%–94%
for dry flood-proofing and 86%–99% for wet flood-
proofing, across the cost schemes. Therefore, unlike
under residual income thresholds of affordability, a
policy focused on expenditure thresholds can have
rates of unaffordability of nearly 0%, maximizing so-
cial access to adaptation measures.
Overall, the introduction of loans for property-
level adaptation measures greatly improves the rates
of affordability by replacing investment affordability
with payment affordability as the relevant concept.
This is in turn spread costs over time, resulting in a
much smaller flow values. While Fig. 3 may not be
surprising, in the sense the measures are more af-
fordable, it highlights the very large difference be-
tween the rates of unaffordability under the different
concepts. This is especially true concerning the vari-
ous expenditure thresholds (Table III vs. Table IV).
Therefore, potentially assuming that the residents of
flood-prone areas have or do not have access to ways
to finance the purchase of adaptation measures can
have large implications for how strategies for pro-
moting adaptation are developed. This is because
1160 Hudson
Fig. 3. Percentage change in the rate of unaffordability due to low-cost loans facilitating a movement from investment affordability to
payment affordability under the residual income definition.
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simply providing incentives such as insurance pre-
mium discounts for adaptation may only be effective
for wealthy residents who can more easily finance
purchases and recoup their expenditure through the
measure’s long-run benefits. This links back to fair-
ness as it implies that without this consideration of
reasonable contributions, the increase mandate of
property-level action may only enhance differences
in patterns of resilience across society.
3.3. 3 Sensitivity Analysis
3.3.1. Income Distribution Assumptions
A core assumption of this work is that the shape
of national income distribution can be used as a
proxy distribution for the various NUTS 2 regions
within a country. This assumption is stronger for
some countries than others. There are 6/28 coun-
tries that consist of a single NUTS 2 region. For
the remaining countries, the number of NUTS 2 re-
gions ranges from 2 (e.g., Croatia or Slovenia) to 39
(Germany), with an average of 12 regions per coun-
try. Therefore, the shape of the income distribution
at the NUTS 2 may differ from the national distribu-
tion. It is also possible that these differences cancel
out when aggregated. Thus, this study aimed to limit
this uncertainty by focusing on the rate of unafford-
ability rather than the magnitude of unaffordability.
The magnitude of unaffordability is the difference
between the affordability threshold and expenditure.
The magnitude of unaffordability may be more sen-
sitive to the shape of the distribution as compared to
the rate of unaffordability. This is because the rate as
compared to the magnitude is not as concerned with
the distance but rather simply that one is likely larger
than the other.
However, the specific implications of this as-
sumption may differ across the two affordability
threshold definitions. Regarding the expenditure
threshold definition with investment affordability,
the rate of unaffordability covers nearly the entire
income distribution. Therefore, it is quite likely that
unless the shapes of the regional income distributions
radically differ from the national, there will not be a
large difference in the final rate of investment unaf-
fordability. The same is likely true for payment af-
fordability, when higher income thresholds are used.
For example, at the 10% of income level, the rate of
payment unaffordability is nearly 0% for wet flood-
proofing. Such low rates of unaffordability also indi-
cate a relative degree of insensitivity to the shape of
the income distribution.
Concerning the residual income threshold defi-
nition, an important note is that this threshold has a
fixed minimum rate that is equal to that defined by
the relative poverty rate. This rate was at 17% at the
EU level in 2015. Similar to the rate of payment af-
fordability under the expenditure definition, it is sim-
ilarly insensitive to the shape of the distribution as
this definition is predominantly focused on the bot-
tom end of the income distribution. This can be seen
how the rates of payment unaffordability closely mir-
ror the rates of relative poverty, as everyone below
this cutoff point will find the measure unaffordable
as well as those reasonably close to it.
Finally, the influence of this source of uncer-
tainty on the resulting implications is limited at the
scale of this study. This is because of the focus on the
rates of unaffordability and the use of varying defi-
nitions and thresholds for affordability. When taken
together, the individual findings repeat how the rates
of unaffordability are much lower when there are
cost-spreading mechanisms in place, in turn helping
to ease social justice concerns by promoting fairer ac-
cess to risk reducing measures. Moreover, while the
calibrated distributions are a rough measure suitable
for the current scale of the analysis, more detailed in-
formation will be required to establish suitable policy
mechanisms at the local level.
3.3.2. Cost Assumptions
The assumptions made in Section 2.1.2 regarding
adaptation costs did not take into account the vary-
ing economic conditions of the countries. Therefore,
two additional price adjustment steps are taken. One
adjusts the costs according to the ratio of domestic
prices relative to the European average in 2015 (Eu-
rostat variable ID: tec00120) accounting for different
price levels. The second adjusts by differences in la-
bor costs relative to the European average (Eurostat
variable ID: lc_lci_lev), as labor costs can be consid-
ered as an important cost element. This can result
in significant changes to the measures costs. For in-
stance, Bulgaria is associated with labor costs 83%
lower than the European average, or a price level
53% of the European average. Denmark on the other
hand is associated with labor costs 59% larger than
the European average or a price level 34% larger
than the European average price level. The implica-
tions of these changes are presented in Table III for
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Table III. The Average National Rate of Investment Unaffordability across Cost Schemes under Various Price Adjustments
Baseline Costs (Table I) Adjustment via Labour Cost Index Adjustment via Relative Price Level Index
Expenditure Definition
5% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 99 99 99
Wet flood-proofing 98 96 98
10% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 99 99 99
Wet flood-proofing 88 81 88
20% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 98 96 98
Wet flood-proofing 63 44 56
Residual income definition
Dry flood-proofing 78 68 75
Wet flood-proofing 47 38 42
Table IV. The Average National Rate of Payment Unaffordability across Cost Schemes under Various Price Adjustments
Baseline Costs (Table I) Adjustment via Labour Cost Index Adjustment via Relative Price Level Index
Expenditure Definition
5% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 50 28 41
Wet flood-proofing 14 6 9
10% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 21 6 11
Wet flood-proofing 4 1 1
20% of income threshold
Dry flood-proofing 6 1 3
Wet flood-proofing 1 0 0
Residual income definition
Dry flood-proofing 21 20 20
Wet flood-proofing 19 18 18
investment affordability and Table IV for payment
affordability at the national level.
Taking investment affordability first, under the
expenditure definition, the 5% and 10% income
thresholds result in relatively minor changes in the
rate of investment unaffordability that remain over
80%. Under the 20% of income threshold, wet flood-
proofing displays a significant drop (up to 20 percent-
age points). However, it remains at least 44%. The
residual income definition also displays a significant
change from 78% to 68% for dry flood-proofing and
47% to 38% for wet flood-proofing. While signifi-
cant changes occur, the overall implication remains
the same, in that, a substantial percentage of people
across Europe would face affordability issues.
Regarding payment affordability, expenditure-
based definitions display large changes. When 5% of
income is used as the threshold, rates of payment un-
affordability fall by 50%, when 10% of income is
used, rates fall by 71%, and fall by nearly 100%
when a threshold of 20% of income is used. There
is a much smaller change when residual income is
used to judge affordability as the rates of payment
affordability fall by a single percentage point. How-
ever, these rates are still 71% lower in the case of
dry flood-proofing and 53% in the case of wet flood-
proofing. Therefore, the core implication remains the
same.
3.3.3. Use of Upper Bound Cost Estimates
Using the upper cost estimate (for the three cost
schemes available) alters investment unaffordabil-
ity little as the measures are unaffordable for the
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majority of households. The results for payment af-
fordability change depending on the affordability
threshold. Under the residual income threshold, pay-
ment unaffordability is, on average, 26% for both
dry and wet flood-proofing. Under the expenditure
threshold (of 20% of income), the rate of unafford-
ability grows to 21% for dry flood-proofing and 22%
for wet flood-proofing. However, these rates of pay-
ment unaffordability are still much lower than for in-
vestment unaffordability, further indicating the im-
portance of cost-spreading mechanisms.
3.3.4. Role of Savings
Savings are a stock variable that can support in-
come in purchasing adaptation measures. Data on
the median savings rate per income quintile (Euro-
stat variable ID: icw_sr_03) show substantial differ-
ences across groups. The European average for the
first income quintile has a savings rate of −0.12 while
the top quintile’s value is 0.36. However, a weakness
of these data is that the total savings available to a
household is unknown, as only a portion of a single
year’s income is assumed to be saved.
The results under the residual income threshold
are unaffected, as the majority of households around
the poverty line have negative saving rates, indicating
little savings to contribute toward investment afford-
ability. Moreover, as a relative threshold, it can also
be understood that the financial resources of the pur-
chaser should not be reduced to that of 60% of the
median purchaser. Under the expenditure threshold,
expenditure on property-level adaptation should not
exceed savings plus the selected income threshold.
Assuming a 5% threshold of disposable income, the
highest average quintile finding dry flood-proofing
unaffordable is 4.5 and for wet flood-proofing, it is
3.25, when savings are included. The use of a 20% in-
come threshold lowers these values to 4.25 and 2.75,
respectively. For dry flood-proofing, this represents a
rate of unaffordability that is 10%–15% lower than
when savings are excluded and 31%–35% lower for
wet flood-proofing.
Overall, the inclusion of additional financial re-
sources can have an effect on investment affordabil-
ity under the residual income threshold but a much
larger effect under the expenditure threshold. How-
ever, while this analysis is rather simplified, it does
indicate that rates of investment unaffordability may
be overestimated, at the top of the income distribu-
tion, due to greater access to financial resources as
households become wealthier.
3.4. Integrated Flood Risk Management
Implications
There is a large difference between the rates
of unaffordability across definitions due to the dif-
ference between having access to financing mecha-
nisms and not. Therefore, access to financing should
be more readily considered as part of fair flood risk
management action and research. Hence, assuming
that such mechanisms are in place can be misleading
on what we expect people to be able to contribute in
a fair manner. More formally looking at affordability
in regard to all aspects of flood risk management can
help to refine these policy objectives. However, the
formalization affordability, as applied to property-
level adaptation measures, is a new aspect of flood
risk management. It is possible that better under-
standing the individual-level construction of the cost-
appraisal elements of Protection Motivation Theory
(Bubeck, Botzen, & Aerts, 2012) could offer insights
into how to better operationalize affordability based
on how people subjectively perceive costs. Develop-
ing these insights with stakeholder input results in
definitions that suitably reflect local social expecta-
tions.
The study results indicate that investment afford-
ability is problematic across all of Europe. However,
the burden this imposes is nearly eliminated under
the expenditure threshold definitions and falls to the,
nearly, lowest rate possible under the residual in-
come definition. Therefore, this movement toward
individual action should be accompanied with mech-
anisms to ensure that sufficient resources or financ-
ing mechanisms are made available. This is in order
to make sure all households have sufficient access
to financial resources if needed. Additionally, if this
outcome is achieved via loans, then the repayment
schedule also provides a reminder to the property
owner of the adaptation measure and the required
maintenance.
The proposed loans can be made available to
those for whom adaptation measures are investment
unaffordable. Moreover, providing low-cost loans
also achieves a social objective in making sure that
lower income households have access to loans, which
may not be possible under full private market condi-
tions (National Research Council, 2015). While low-
cost loans generate higher rates of affordability, the
effect’s magnitude differs across affordability thresh-
old definitions. Therefore, if thresholds similar to the
residual income threshold are used, then policymak-
ers may need to couple the loans with additional
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mechanisms (e.g., vouchers) to provide equal adap-
tation opportunities to those who are beneath the
poverty line. Such mechanisms can be connected to
preexisting welfare payments. Moreover, the system
may require a degree of flexibility around the point at
which loans are provided. This is because households
may be labelled as requiring assistance just because
they live in a generally wealthy environment, because
of changing patterns of income inequality, for exam-
ple. Therefore, effects to incentivize the adaptation
should have mechanisms to help provide suitable as-
sistance to ease one avenue through which property-
level adaptation is limited. Other measures may be
required to stimulate demand for these measures in
the first place. Linking such concerns is a natural ex-
tension of integrated flood risk management, which
seeks to create a suitable enabling environment
for risk reduction across all actors (Bubeck et al.,
2017).
An implicit assumption made is that the sug-
gested loans are provided by a public sector organi-
zation in order to provide suitable support for people
to adapt. However, public resources may be scarce
and, even though with loans some of the program
costs are recouped, resources may not be available.
Therefore, there is scope for collaboration in public–
private partnerships (PPPs) to provide these loans.
PPPs are argued to be useful in the disaster insur-
ance space (Kunreuther, 2015). Through closer col-
laboration, additional resources and experiences can
be leveraged to address the complex issues of how
the residents of flood-prone areas can contribute to
flood risk management. This approach is similar to
the elevation certificates offered for flood insurance
premium discounts as part of the National Flood In-
surance Program in the United States (Aerts et al.,
2013). The above is one possible mechanism to in-
crease the affordability of property-level adaptation
measures that are often mentioned in the literature
(e.g., Botzen & van den Bergh, 2008; Montgomery &
Kunreuther, 2018). However, flood risk management
takes place at the national or subnational level. This
means that flood risk management can be considered
as a result of public policy choices (Hudson, Botzen,
& Aerts, 2019; Surminski, 2017), rendering it likely
that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution (Surminski
et al., 2015) and as such, risk managers can compare
the suitability of a range of alternative mechanisms
given the needs and preferences of local stakehold-
ers. For instance, the first alternative is “flood risk
mitigation grants,” whereby the resident directly re-
ceives funds for property-level adaptation. This strat-
egy addresses affordability by rendering measures in-
vestment affordable and therefore do not need their
costs to be spread over time. This has the implications
of social transfer. This in itself is not necessarily prob-
lematic as a result of policy choices. However, the re-
sources spent will only be recouped in a social sense
through lower flood damage. This could be problem-
atic depending on the social transfer required. How-
ever, it is not possible, a priori, to establish the to-
tal size of these transfers as they depend on uptake
rates, the particular measures employed, etc. A loan
system, on the other hand, mitigates some of these
social transfers through loan repayments. A further
relative of a loan system could be the resulting en-
dowment effects, which is where the owner values
measures more because they own the product (Eric-
son & Fuster, 2014), which can help with the main-
tenance of flood-proofing measures they have pur-
chased rather than one “gifted” via a grant.
An additional alternative to loans in moving
from investment to payment affordability is zoning
regulations. Zoning regulations for flood risk man-
agement can require that all new buildings in flood-
prone areas, if development cannot be redirected,
are mandated to integrate property-level measures
into their construction process (Burby, 2001; Burby,
Deyle, Godschalk, & Olshansky, 2001; Hudson &
Botzen, 2019). This mechanism places the cost of the
measures as a relatively small portion of the prop-
erty cost, as it is cheaper to build these measures into
new property rather than retrofitting existing prop-
erty (Aerts et al., 2013). Therefore, their cost will
be annualized either as mortgage or rental payments.
This approach brings two advantages; adaptation no
longer requires a proactive choice overcoming sev-
eral behavioral heuristics by shifting the responsibil-
ity to a smaller number of property developers. The
second is that by connecting these payments to hous-
ing prices, in effect, it can be connected to preexisting
welfare systems aimed at aiding people who find their
housing costs unaffordable. A weakness is that it is
most applicable to new buildings, whereas redirect-
ing development in flood prone is a more productive
avenue for limiting flood impacts and it requires the
zoning regulations to be enforced.
Additionally, in each of the three above mech-
anisms social transfers are a component either di-
rectly, via loans or grants, or indirectly, via the wel-
fare system. These transfers can also be seen as a
needed requirement of a greater focus on individual-
level action in flood risk management in order to
make sure that all of society can take part in risk
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management as called for in the sustainable devel-
opment goals (SDGs) or Sendai Framework.
A final consideration is moral hazard if the em-
ployed mechanism promotes a negative behavioral
change could be promoted. For instance, encourag-
ing more lower income households to reside in flood-
prone areas, however, this is unlikely to be a sig-
nificant problem if measures that are known to be
cost-effective are focused upon. This increases the
likelihood of a positive net impact through increased
risk reduction measure employment rates, especially
if this activity is considered as part of a wider in-
tegrated flood risk management plan. Additionally,
there is a possibility that the respondent may not use
the loan or grant for the stated purpose. This could be
mitigated by directly transferring to the organization
that installs the adaptation measures when support is
requested (similar to household-level insulation up-
grades in the United Kingdom for example).
4. CONCLUSION
The movement toward integrated flood risk
management places greater obligations on the res-
idents of flood-prone areas to reduce risk through
proactive adaptation. However, this additional re-
quirement requires that the burden imposed on
households be assessed. This is to aid in developing
the use of fair flood risk management metrics for a
range of adaptation strategies outside of insurance to
more widely integrate social justice metrics into flood
risk decision making.
This article seeks to begin this assessment by ex-
tending the study of fair flood risk management prin-
ciples via the affordability of property-level adapta-
tion measures across Europe. This was achieved by
combing information on property-level adaptation
costs with interpolated income distributions across
two different concepts of affordability and afford-
ability thresholds. It was found that in terms of
investment affordability, property-level adaptation
measures are not affordable. However, payment af-
fordability is much higher, thereby highlighting the
benefits of developing strategies that spreads ex-
penditures over time. Therefore, these mechanisms
should be more actively considered within flood risk
management and research.
The main implication is the importance of ad-
dressing the needs of vulnerable populations to pro-
duce a fair or just outcome for flood risk manage-
ment. Vulnerable populations face disproportionate
subjective flood impacts and also have a limited ca-
pacity to limit these impacts. The limited capacity to
adapt is problematic for additional obligations im-
posed through integrated flood risk management ap-
proaches. This movement requires a greater focus on
fair flood risk management principles so that all those
threatened by, and mandated to act against, flooding
are able to act. The concept of affordability can act
as a metric of “fair” contributions to identify those
who face difficulties and require additional support
to achieve fair flood risk management outcomes. The
results indicate the need for payment affordability to
be the widely applicable concept in both policy and
research. Once a suitable threshold is determined,
the provision of low-cost loans is a potential mecha-
nism to render adaptation affordable under this con-
cept. However, achieving this outcome depends on
specific public policy choices. Therefore, other mech-
anisms such as grants or the better integration of
property-level adaptation measures into zoning poli-
cies and preexisting welfare systems maybe be locally
preferred methods for achieving this outcome.
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